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Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas.

We gratefully appreciate the efforts made by all the reviewers. Hughes et al. [2018] extend the inequity aversion model and define a shaped reward These works aim to improve cooperation but cannot guarantee fairness. We compare against Hughes et al. [2018], More details will be included in the final version. To verify the effectiveness of the hierarchy, we use the hierarchy with other baselines in job scheduling. That demonstrates the effect of the hierarchy. The intuition of the fair-efficient reward is to maximize the resource utilization while punish the agent's utility deviation The main hyperparameters are contained in the Appendix, we will make a further supplement in the final version.

Summary The authors consider the addition of inequity aversion to learning agents in social dilemmas. They show that inequity aversion as a heuristic helps systems converge to cooperation. They show this is true even when only a few agents are inequity averse. Evaluation There is a lot to like about this paper. There are 2 main contributions: 1) Rather than considering end-to-end learning the authors consider simple heuristics that can be readily applied to solve a wide class of problems.

Humans are not homo economicus (i.e., rational economic beings). As humans, we exhibit systematic behavioral biases such as loss aversion, anchoring, framing, etc., which lead us to make suboptimal economic decisions. Insofar as such biases may be embedded in text data on which large language models (LLMs) are trained, to what extent are LLMs prone to the same behavioral biases? Understanding these biases in LLMs is crucial for deploying LLMs to support human decision-making. We propose utility theory-a paradigm at the core of modern economic theory-as an approach to evaluate the economic biases of LLMs. Utility theory enables the quantification and comparison of economic behavior against benchmarks such as perfect rationality or human behavior. To demonstrate our approach, we quantify and compare the economic behavior of a variety of open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that the economic behavior of current LLMs is neither entirely human-like nor entirely economicus-like. We also find that most current LLMs struggle to maintain consistent economic behavior across settings. Finally, we illustrate how our approach can measure the effect of interventions such as prompting on economic biases.

Several social interventions (e.g., suicide and HIV prevention) leverage social network information to maximize outreach. Algorithmic influence maximization techniques have been proposed to aid with the choice of influencers (or peer leaders) in such interventions. Traditional algorithms for influence maximization have not been designed with social interventions in mind. As a result, they may disproportionately exclude minority communities from the benefits of the intervention. This has motivated research on fair influence maximization. Existing techniques require committing to a single domain-specific fairness measure. This makes it hard for a decision maker to meaningfully compare these notions and their resulting trade-offs across different applications. We address these shortcomings by extending the principles of cardinal welfare to the influence maximization setting, which is underlain by complex connections between members of different communities. We generalize the theory regarding these principles and show under what circumstances these principles can be satisfied by a welfare function. We then propose a family of welfare functions that are governed by a single inequity aversion parameter which allows a decision maker to study task-dependent trade-offs between fairness and total influence and effectively trade off quantities like influence gap by varying this parameter. We use these welfare functions as a fairness notion to rule out undesirable allocations. We show that the resulting optimization problem is monotone and submodular and can be solved with optimality guarantees. Finally, we carry out a detailed experimental analysis on synthetic and real social networks and should that high welfare can be achieved without sacrificing the total influence significantly. Interestingly we can show there exists welfare functions that empirically satisfy all of the principles.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.

Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix games. Recently, multi-agent reinforcement learning has been applied to generalize social dilemma problems to temporally and spatially extended Markov games. However, this has not yet generated an agent that learns to cooperate in social dilemmas as humans do. A key insight is that many, but not all, human individuals have inequity averse social preferences. This promotes a particular resolution of the matrix game social dilemma wherein inequity-averse individuals are personally pro-social and punish defectors. Here we extend this idea to Markov games and show that it promotes cooperation in several types of sequential social dilemma, via a profitable interaction with policy learnability. In particular, we find that inequity aversion improves temporal credit assignment for the important class of intertemporal social dilemmas. These results help explain how large-scale cooperation may emerge and persist.